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This paper presents a multi-product price linked spatial equilibrium model of world steel trade. The 
model is used to analyse the impacts of the safeguard trade barriers brought about by the United States 
in order to protect their domestic industry from so called unfair competition. Emphasis is placed on the 
likely effect to the Australian industry and possible policy responses available to the industry. A case 
study is made on Australia’s three largest export products, namely slab, hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel, 
which share some substitutability in supply and demand due to the nature of the industry. 
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Trade protection is often viewed as an inefficient means to achieve a domestic policy 
outcome. Further, trade policies aimed at protecting or improving domestic 
employment and encouraging structural reform rarely succeed due to the lack of 
consideration given to other sectors of the economy. The benefits from trade, to both 
importing and exporting countries are significant, with many countries advocating 
free trade so that the global economy can maximise these benefits. It is interesting 
then, that a country such as the United States — a traditional supporter of free trade in 
the manufacturing sector — has advocated a policy which restricts trade to achieve a 
domestic policy outcome.  
 
On the 6
th of March 2002, President George W Bush announced a series of punitive 
tariff barriers on imported steel into the United States. The measures included a range 
of tariffs on processed steel products, which had the potential to affect Australia’s 
exports to the United States by the value of $400 million (Davis and Collins 2002). 
Australia’s largest steel export to the United States — slab steel — was relatively un-
effected with the implementation of a global tariff quota of 5.4 million tonnes. 
Further, a concession on Australia hot-rolled steel products was granted such that 
250kt of exports would be exempted from the new barriers. Recently, the World 
Trade organisation has ruled the safeguard measures illegal; however the United 
States government has rejected the finding. As such, it is unclear whether the US will 
remove the tariffs, or face retaliation from steel exporting nations. 
 
President Bush blamed trade-distorting subsidies from steel producing nations for the 
increase in imports to the United States. Bush reasoned that the subsidies provided to 
overseas steel producers lead to excess capacity in the global steel industry, with 
excess stocks being ‘dumped’ on the US market (Bush 2002). The temporary 
protection measures were aimed at restoring market forces in the US steel market. 
This would allow steel producers to restructure their operations in order to re-gain a 
comparative advantage. Coupled with the tariff barriers, President Bush indicated that 
he wished to expand the National Grants Programme in order to help re-train workers 
whose jobs would be lost due to structural reform. He also planned to provide direct 
assistance to help firms with health care costs, which have led too much of the 
inefficiencies experienced (Bush 2002). 
 
The aim of the study is to investigate the motives and effects that the US safeguard 
tariffs and quotas, placed by the United States on the importation of steel products, 
would have on the Australian, and world steel industries. Further, even those these 
barriers may be removed, the study will examine the use of trade policy to achieve a 
domestic policy objective. The structure of this paper follows; an overview of the 
world steel market presented in section 2 with the history and motives behind the 
current protectionist measures imposed by the United States, in section 3 details of the 
spatial equilibrium used to model the industry are given, section 4 defines the   4
assumptions of the empirical model with results and policy implications discussed in 
sections 5 and 6. The impacts to be assessed in this study are the likely changes in 
volume and direction of trade flows caused by the implementation of the tariffs and 
the subsequent changes in consumer and producer surplus calculated as a change in 
net revenue for producers and a change in total benefit less the price paid for steel 
consumed by consumers. 
 
2. The world steel environment 
 
Steel consumption in terms of finished product equivalent fell amongst OECD 
member nations from 1997 to 1998 (OECD 1999, p. 11). However, during this period 
the United States experienced an increase in demand due to strong economic growth. 
During this period, global stocks of steel rose. This increase in stocks placed 
downward pressure on prices in the following years. 
 
The increase in stocks was partly brought about by falls in steel prices and was the 
reason for maintaining lower prices in 1999. Steel stocks were expected to decrease in 
1999 and in 2000 but remained higher than pre 1998 levels (OECD 1999, p. 11). The 
high levels of stocks kept steel prices low over the following years, increasing the 
competitiveness of imports on the world market. Production levels also fell during 
1998 by just under 3 percent (OECD 1999, p. 12). 
 
The level of stocks and capacity in the global steel industry was seen as the major 
cause of low prices and the reason behind moves towards protectionist policies by 
nations around the world (Maurer and Lynch 2002). Excess capacity and stock levels 
have risen in recent years with low world prices due to the economic downturn in 
Asian countries. The global excess capacity of the steel industry in 2001 was 
estimated to be 1,070 million tonnes, representing 14 percent of current global 
production (Maurer and Lynch 2002). 
 
The United States represents the largest export market for Australian steel products 
followed by South Korea and Taiwan. In 1999, slab steel accounted for around 50 
percent of total steel exports, with hot rolled sheet and coil accounting for around 17 
percent of total steel exports (Ferber 2002, p. 23). Cold rolled sheet and coil 
accounted for close to 2 percent of the total exports in 1999 (Ferber 2002, p. 23). 
 
3. Steel production and users 
 
The steel industry is comprised of different enterprises that produce finished steel mill 
product and semi-finished slabs, blooms, and billets from iron ore, steel scrap, or both 
(Crandall 1981, p. 5). The output from steel producers is in the form of carbon, alloy 
or stainless steel. Carbon steel comprises the bulk of world steel production. The 
major consumers of steel goods are the construction and automotive industries 
(Crandall 1981, p. 5).  
 
The steel production process is shown in Figure 1. As seen, slab steel is a primary 
form of steel. The input source for slab steel and other semi-finished products is iron 
ore. This iron ore is processed through various production methods to produce molten 
steel, which is used to produce slabs, blooms and billets. Hot rolled and cold rolled   5
products are the finished steel products and use slab steel and other semi-finished 
products as their input source. 
 
Source: Crandall (1981) p. 8. 
 
Figure 1: Steel Production Process 
 
Steel is a major input into most manufacturing industries. It is used in a range of 
products from defence goods to cars and therefore plays a major role in any national 
security plan developed by nations. This is one reason for the continuing involvement 
of the United States government in the steel industry aside from issues concerned with 
public choice. 
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4. Protection in the United States 
 
The American integrated steel industry faces competition pressures from both home 
and aboard. High cost integrated steel manufacturers, due to a highly unionised 
workforce and high cost production methods are under threat from smaller domestic 
mini-mill producers and foreign imports which have captured a quarter of the 
American market (Anon 2002).  
 
An integrated steel manufacturing plant is one, which uses iron ore in order to 
produce its steel via a blast furnace production method. A mini-mill is a steel 
manufacturing plant that users scrap steel, which is melted down to be reformed into 
new hot rolled and flat steel products. Mini-mills have expanded their market share 
since the 1970s from 5 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1996 (Crandall 1996). This 
growth was attributed to a sharp decline in scrap steel prices and relatively low 
production costs. Integrated steel producers have a highly unionised workforce and as 
part of the conditions negotiated by the unions, companies are required to pay 
generous benefits to retired employees (Crandall 1996). 
 
As such mini-mill producers have a significant cost advantage over the larger 
integrated steel producers. This cost advantage has arisen from two sources, lower 
fixed costs and lower labour costs. For the industry, the United Steel Association 
estimates the costs to be close to $US1 billion annually, or on average, $US9 per 
tonne produced (Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002). Further to these payments, it is 
estimated that the higher capital costs incurred by integrated steel producers, mean 
that fixed costs per tonne of hot rolled steel produced are equivalent to $US130 for 
integrated producers, compared with a cost of $US30 for mini-mills (Hufbauer and 
Goodrich 2002). However, this cost disadvantage is partly offset by higher variable 
costs for mini-mills (Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002). 
 
The United States became a net steel importer in 1959 and, with the emergence of 
Japan as a major exporter of steel products, imports gained greater penetration into the 
US market. From 1967 to 1968, domestic producers looked to overseas suppliers to 
fill their steel orders. This fall in demand for locally produced steel lead to the 
formation of the Voluntary Restraint Agreements with Japan and the European Union 
(Jones 1983, p. 8). These agreements placed voluntary restraints on steel exports to 
the United States. 
 
Despite initial success, in 1979, the last year of the agreement, imports rose again 
sharply (Jones 1983, pp. 10-1). The reason for this rise was believed to be linked with 
the decline in the threat by the United States of import barriers, the lack of coverage 
(nations and products) and as prices rose, exporting nations responded to market 
forces and not the possible threat of unilateral trade protection by the United States 
(Jones 1983, p. 13).  
 
Post the Voluntary Restraint Agreements a Trigger Price Mechanism was introduced 
in 1977 in order to offer a form of binding import restraint (as the voluntary restraint 
agreements where not binding but only upheld by goodwill on the part of the 
members). The mechanism established a system of dumping reference prices, which if 
import prices fell below the specified levels, then they would become subject to an 
investigation and possible anti-dumping duties applied. The aim of this policy was to   7
quell the protectionist demand by steel producers and also to allow the government 
control over import restraints (Jones 1983, p. 50). 
 
In 1982 the Trigger Price Mechanism was replaced, in part, by an agreement between 
the European Community and the United States to limit imports into the United States 
(Jones 1983, p. 79). After continuing problems post the minimum price scheme, the 
United States negotiated seven new voluntary restraint agreements with importing 
countries in an effort to stem fears of anti-dumping actions by United States 
producers. Even with these agreements the United States steel industry filed an anti-
dumping action against a non-agreement importer. The United States denied anti-
dumping claims by domestic producers and decided instead, to negotiate further 
voluntary export restraints (Howell et al 1988, p. 530). 
 
This further intervention failed to solve the problems of the US steel industry as 
imports from non-agreement nations increased. Further to this, major steel suppliers 
to the United States such as Canada, Sweden, Argentina and Taiwan did not enter 
export restraint agreements and took advantage of the situation which limited their 
competitors supply (Howell et al 1988, p. 533). The reluctance to pursue market 
reforms in the face of competition and instead to look for government protection has 
been instilled in the US steel industry by continual government support.  
 
Government intervention into the US steel industry can be seen as a case of policy 
persistence. The continued government intervention leads to a change in decision 
making as decision makers change their behaviour believing government support will 
be provided and thereby creating demand for that support should it not be given 
(Coate and Morris 1999). The recent safeguard actions by the United States can been 
seen as a further extension of a problem that first appeared in the 1960s and one 
which has been exacerbated by government intervention in steel trade since that time. 
 
In the period between 1997 and 2001, 29 US steel firms filed for bankruptcy. Further 
to this, a total of 21 have closed since the 2000 presidential elections (Hufbauer and 
Goodrich 2002). These closures have lead to approximately 10,370 jobs being directly 
lost to the steel industry, with Bethlehem Steel and LTV causing most of the job 
loses. These jobs losses have placed pressure on governments to act in some way to 
lessen the hardship from closures of large industries. In 2001, the US International 
Trade Commission found that there was injury to local producers caused by imports. 
This gave the government the right to impose trade barriers (Maurer and Lynch 2002). 
The full range of trade barriers are presented in Table 1. 
 
The national security argument has been used to defend the move by the Bush 
administration to safeguard the United States steel industry. Steel is an important 
input into the manufacturing sector of the economy, and in a period of global 
uncertainty after the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the United States 
government has been less willing to rely on imports. A Republican Senator was 
quoted as saying “It’s important to have a vibrant domestic source of steel” 
(Stevenson 2001, p. C.1). This reason is used to defend the government’s attempts to 
maintain integrated steel producers as the mini-mill sector relies on imports as well as 
domestic supplies of scrap steel as its major input source. However, in 1997, the 
United States imported 18.6 mega tonnes of iron ore, representing close to 23 percent 
of consumption (ABARE 1998, p. 280).   8
 
Table 1: Restrictions on Australian Steel Exports to the United States 
Product Remedy Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Slabs TRQ
a 30% 24% 18%
Hot rolled coil for re-rolling by steelscape Exemption 250kt 250kt 250kt
Other hot-rolled sheet and coil Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Cold-rolled sheet and coil Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Plate Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Coated Sheet Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Tin Mill products Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Hot-rolled bar, cold finished bar Tariff 30% 24% 18%
Rebar Tariff 15% 12% 9%
Certain welded tubular products Tariff 15% 12% 9%
Stainless rod and bar Tariff 15% 12% 9%
Stainless wire Tariff 8% 7% 6%
Pipe and tube fittings and flanges Tariff 13% 10% 7% 
 
a TRQ: tariff rate quota, 30% tariff applies to tonnages in excess of country quota in year 1, 24% in year 2 and 18% 
in year 3, kt = thousand tonnes. 
Source: USITC and Whitehouse web sites 
 
The determinants of industry assistance may be expressed as a function of two factors, 
those that affect vested interest groups’ incentive to demand assistance, and those that 
affect the governments’ incentive to supply assistance (Anderson 1978). Changes in 
the mix of assistance are thereby caused by changes in one or both of these factors 
(Anderson 1978). 
 
The United States steel industry has been declining in relative importance to the 
economy since the 1950s. Steel employed 1.5 percent of workers in the United States 
in 1950, 0.6 percent in 1980, 0.2 percent in 2000 and 0.1 percent in 2002 (Henwood 
2002). As the relative importance of an industry falls, the effects of its eventually 
failing become more localised, and hence the loss to fewer individuals increases. This 
leads to a greater incentive for those individuals to become organised and lobby 
governments for assistance. Generally, the impact of government assistance on the 
rest of the economy, and the cost of that assistance is less than if the industry was still 
large. This reason makes it more likely for governments to be persuaded to support a 
certain industry, particularly if re-election hopes are affected by votes in the industries 
geographic heartland. However, in the case of steel, the effect on the rest of the 
economy is great due to its importance for the manufacturing sector. 
 
5. The modelling of steel trade 
 
The impact of tariffs and quotas usually sees a reduction in total welfare in the 
economy which implements the measures. Tariffs are imposed in order to raise the 
domestic price above the world price and hence allow domestic industries to compete 
with imports at a higher price level (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998, pp. 312-18). Tariffs 
are generally a tax on imports for goods entering into a country, either placed as a 
percentage of their dollar price or a fixed amount on each unit imported.  
 
Tariffs placed by small importing nations (those which cannot influence world price) 
will create a fall in welfare. The tariff causes several distributional effects, there is 
transferred surplus from consumers to producers and a transfer from consumers to 
government (tariff revenue); both these effects do not represent a fall in efficiency 
(Tisdell 1992, p. 105). Further, there are effects that represent a fall in efficiency and   9
as such a welfare loss, there is a transfer of consumer surplus to production cost and 
an area of forgone surplus as consumers have to re-allocate budgets to reflect a 
change in relative prices. 
 
In the case of the safeguard tariffs used to protect the US steel industry, a series of ad 
valorem tariffs were used. The economic impacts and consequences of these ad 
valorem tariffs are basically the same as a fixed rate tariff. The ad valorem tariff is set 
as some percent of the international price, causing high prices to be skewed away 




















Figure 2: Effect of an ad valorem tariff 
PW is world price; PS is support price and other variables as defined 
 
An ad valorem tariff is depicted in Figure 2. The ad valorem tariff is applied as a 
percentage ‘mark up’ (θ) on import price (Market A’s price). The non-tariff barrier 
transfer price between markets (given costless transfer) is given by the 45 degree line, 
that is, the price in Market B is the same as in Market A. The imposition of a tariff 
creates a wedge between the two prices, causing the price in Market B to rise, whilst 
creating a fall in price for Market A. The tariff revenue collected is shown by the 
shaded regions on Figure 2. It can be seen that revenue is collected from both 
markets, with the share determined by relative elasticities. The result of the tariff 
induced change in relative prices is an increase in domestic production at the cost of 
production in the exporting nation (Qd-Qa less Qc-Qb). Further, demand in the 
importing nation falls, whilst increases in the exporting nation. 
 
Quotas restrict the amount of an imported product into the domestic market. After the 
implementation of an effective quota, domestic price increases causing domestic 
production to increase from the free trade level. This increase in output represents a 
shift in the resources used in the domestic economy away from more efficient uses, to 
inefficient use in the production of the protected good. This efficiency loss within the 
domestic economy is similar to that for a tariff.  
 
An import quota has significant external effects on overseas producers if the 
importing country is large. The change in excess demand on the world market causes 
the world price to fall and the domestic price to rise. This fall in world price and rise 
in domestic price means that the imposing country is able to extract a level of quota 
rent from world producers. The collection of quota revenue will be similar to that seen   10
in Figure 2 and depend on relative elasticities; however, the feed back in the fall in 
world price will not occur. 
 
A tariff quota (or tariff rate quota) was imposed on Australian steel exports. A tariff 
quota is comprised of two parts, a ‘within-quota’ tariff and ‘out-quota’ tariff. The 
‘within-quota’ tariff applies to the goods that are imported within the quota — in the 
Australian case; the within-quota tariff is equal to zero. The ‘out-quota’ tariff is the 
tariff rate applied to any goods, which are imported over the set quota  
 




























Figure 3: Tariff rate quota (within quota trade only) 
Di is demand in region i; and i = A,B, Si is supply in region i; Pw
j is world price; and Ps is support price. 
 
The effect of a tariff quota with a prohibitive out-quota tariff is shown in Figure 3. If a 
zero tariff is applied to the first ‘quota’ units, that is, the within-quota tariff, and an 
out-quota tariff equal to ‘θ’ (an ad valorem tariff), a stepped price ratio results 
(assuming no transport costs). The effect on the domestic economy is the same as 
with a quota, with one difference. A standard quota allows no feed back of world 
price to the domestic market; however, with a tariff quota there is an opportunity for a 
change in world price to feed back to the domestic market. If the price were to fall 
below Pw
3 in Figure 3, then some units would be imported with the out-quota tariff 
applied. The effect of this would be to lead to a lower domestic price and increased 
imports. 
 
6. Spatial Equilibrium model 
 
A spatial equilibrium model was used to evaluate the impacts of the US safeguard 
measures on steel trade. A spatial equilibrium model was first constructed by Enke 
(1951) and mathematically solved by Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge 
(1971). Such models can be formulated with either prices or quantities as the 
dependant variables (Krishnaiah and Krishnamoorthy 1990). The approach uses either 
an welfare based objective function, or a net revenue function, which equals zero at 
the competitive equilibrium. The simplest from of a spatial equilibrium model is 
constructed under the assumption of perfect competition, where supply, demand and 
transfer costs are known (Batterham and MacAulay 1994). An excess demand 
function is derived as the horizontal difference between demand and supply in a   11
market. Conversely, excess supply is the horizontal subtraction of the supply function 
from the demand function. When world price is below the autarky price, the excess 
demand function is positive indicating that domestic demand is greater than domestic 
supply. When the world price is above the autarky price, the excess supply function is 
positive indicating that the domestic supply is greater than demand. 
 
Where the excess demand and supply curves intersect, the quantity and direction of 
trade is determined (Figure 4). The flow of goods occurs from country 1 to country 2 
(denoted as x12) (Figure 4). With transfer costs equal to zero, the trade equilibrium 
would be given by the intersection of the excess demand and excess supply curves. 
On Figure 4, transfer costs are given by t12 and represent a positive cost. The effect of 
this is to make the price lower in the exporting market (region 1) and higher in the 
importing market (region 2) than is the case with no transfer costs. 
 
Samuelson (1952) provided a means to solve more complex spatial models by using 
the concepts of consumer and producer surplus and a mathematical programming 
formulation. Samuelson described the ‘net social pay-off’ from trade as the benefit to 
producers from the exporting countries and the benefit to consumers in the importing 
countries less the transfer costs (the shaded area on Figure 4). This is given by the 
area between the excess demand and supply curves in Figure 4 less the total transfer 
costs. The equilibrium is then defined as the point where the net social payoff is 
maximised. 
 






























Figure 4: Trade between two regions 
Where xi is supply in region i; yi is domestic demand in region i; where i = 1,2 ESi is excess supply from region i; EDi is excess 
demand from region i; t12 is transfer cost from region 1 to region 2; xij is exports from region i to region j. and j is 1,2. Pi is price in 
region t;  P
a
i is autarky price for region i, 
 
The excess supply and demand functions can be used to show the welfare effects from 
trade. Trade causes welfare changes as prices rise for the exporting region (country 1) 
and fall for the importing region (country 2). As such there are associated changes in 
producer and consumer surplus. As prices rise for the exporter, producer surplus 
increases and consumer surplus falls (the opposite case is true for the importing 
nation). The area between the excess supply and excess demand functions less 
transfer costs represents the net welfare gain from trade (shown by the shaded area in 
Figure 4), and it is changes in these that will be examined to determine the welfare 
impacts of the safeguard measures. 
 
The approach used in this study is one based on the quadratic programming model 
developed by Takayama and Judge (1971) and that used by Batterham and MacAulay 
(1994). Takayama and Judge (1971) showed that the Samuelson model, based on a 
social welfare function could be solved using what was termed ‘net social monetary   12
gain’ as the objective function (referred to as the ‘net revenue’ function in Batterham 
and MacAulay (1994)). 
 
The net social revenue solution is depicted in Figure 5. Under perfect competition, a 
transfer services demand function can be implicitly derived from the vertical 
difference between the excess supply and excess demand functions. The difference 
between the excess supply and excess demand functions is the difference in the 
autarky prices between the regions, and hence, as long as transfer costs do not exceed 
the difference between the curves, trade will take place. In other words, the vertical 
distance between the curves is the ‘willingness to pay’ for transfer services and is 
effectively the demand for transfer services. Total revenue from transfer services is 
equal to the total traded volume multiplied by transfer costs. Under perfect 
competition, the set of price transfer cost relationships are required to hold so that the 







































Figure 5: Representation of a net social revenue solution 
 
There are three sets of equilibrium conditions that are essential to the spatial 
equilibrium model. First, the difference in prices between markets must be less than 
or equal to the transfer costs between each of the markets (Samuelson 1952). This 
condition is known as an arbitrage condition and can be seen as an extension of the 
law of one price. It is based on the assumption that the products from each region are 
perfect substitutes and that no firm has market power to influence price (that is perfect 
competition). Second, supply can be separated into trade flows. If the quantity   13
produced in one-region (x1) remains in that region, then the trade flow x11 is such that 
y1 = x1 = x11. In other words, in autarky, the demand in region 1 (y1) is equal to the 
supply in region 1 (x1). With trade, demand in any region, yj, is local production, xj, 
plus imports Σj xij. Conversely, the supply, xi, is equal to exports, Σi xij, plus demand, 
yi. The spatial model allows for no excess demand to exist, but does allow excess 
supply if a slack variable is included in the model (MacAulay 1976, p. 159).  
 
A price-orientated spatial equilibrium differs from a quantity-oriented spatial model 
as outlined by Martin (1981), in its decision variables. In both models the returns from 
trade for the participating nations are maximised, that is, the area between the excess 
supply and excess demand functions less the transfer costs (net social revenue) are 
maximised (Batterham and MacAulay 1994). Price-orientated spatial equilibrium 
models reach equilibrium in the simulated market through solution for price levels 
which give rise to quantities produced and traded as the Lagrangian multipliers on the 
dual variables. In the quantity formulation the solution is for quantities that 
subsequently lead to equilibrium prices as the dual variables.  
 
7. Empirical model 
 
7.1 Elasticities and data used in the model 
A spatial equilibrium model requires data on consumption, productions and exports. 
These data points are used in conjunction with elasticities to estimate the supply and 
demand functions for the regions in the model. The data were collected from 
International Iron and Steel Institute (2002), American Iron and Steel Institute (2002) 
Ferber (2002), and International Trade Commission (2002). The data obtained was 
used to develop a global balance sheet for steel production for 1999 as this was the 
most current year in which a full data set was available. As such, the results obtained 
are based on changes from the 1999 levels, however, export levels to the United 
States remained stable over the period from 1999 to 2002 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).  
 
The demand for slab steel can be seen as a derived demand. If this is the case, the 
elasticity for the derived product is a function of the final product and the marketing 
margin involved. The marketing margin is the difference in the price from the derived 
level and the final level, or in this case, the semi-finished steel price and the finished 
steel price. The finished steel price is greater than the semi-finished price due to the 
extra production costs (marketing margins) involved in transforming the good from its 
semi-finished to finished state.  
 
The elasticity at the derived level is less than the elasticity at the retail level because 
the derived price is lower than the retail price (Tomek and Robinson 1990, p. 42). As 
such, demand for slab steel is assumed to be fairly inelastic — more inelastic than 
final products such as coated sheet and hot rolled sheet.  
 
The steel industry uses many inputs which are industry specific (even labour can be 
seen as fairly immobile due to the specialised nature of the skills required). It is 
assumed that factors are as mobile down the production process as up the production 
process — that is from coated products to hot rolled to slab. Although there is a large 
capital expenditure required to move into finished products, and there is a large 
capacity of many integrated steel producers responsible for producing much of the 
semi-finished products (Crandall 1981, p. 12), the substitution elasticities are assumed   14
to be the same due to the fact that it would take time to move from one process to the 
other and the static nature of the spatial equilibrium analysis. 
 
Information on supply elasticities was unavailable, and as such, the elasticities of 
supply were estimated. Supply for steel products is assumed to be relatively elastic for 
all steel products. Slab steel is assumed to have a more elastic supply due to it being a 
primary product, whilst the elasticity of the further processed steel is assumed to be 
more inelastic. Again, elasticities for the Rest of World region are assumed to be more 
elastic than for the other nations. Due to the uncertainty about the elasticities being 
estimated for use in this study, a range of elasticities will be used to examine the 
sensitivity of the model. A similar technique will be used for the cross-price 
elasticities. 
 
Inventory (stocks) data were unavailable and so a just in time production process has 
been assumed. This assumption will be weak in some respects as producers of hot 
rolled and coated sheet products would hold inventories of slab steel and other semi-
finished steel products in order to be more responsive to shifts in demand. However, 
exporters if holding stocks would still face the tariffs applied and hence be subject to 
the same conditions. Crandall (1981, p. 124) estimated total stocks of slab steel in the 
United States to be close to six million tonnes, which would mean their response to a 
price rise (in terms of quantity produced) would be greater than otherwise. Inventory 
levels for steel products in the United States were estimated to be equal to 1.82 
months of production (Jondrow et al 1982). This level corresponded to an average 
level of 103 tonnes per producer, with estimates of imported steel inventory levels 
being equal to zero (Jondrow et al 1982) —that is, a just in time supply was used 
 
7.2 The model structure 
The products chosen were slab steel, hot-rolled steel and coated sheet steel due to 
their significance to the Australian industry. Slab steel is Australia’s major steel 
export to the United States, followed by hot rolled products (Ferber 2002, p. 7). The 
tariffs applied excluded some slab steel exports within a global quota, with hot rolled 
products later subject to a quota exclusion as well. To assess the impact, coated sheet 
steel was chosen as it also attracted the full tariffs. The countries included in the study 
were Australia, the United States of America, Japan, Rest of World importing nations 
and Rest of World exporting nations. 
 
As production and consumption of steel can change between products, particularly 
due to the application of trade distorting measures that favour one product over 
another, substitution coefficients were estimated. Substitution coefficients were 
calculated for each steel product in order to measure whether producers would 
respond to the tariffs by sending alternate products into the United States. The 
substitution of each steel product for the other, that is slab steel for hot rolled, slab 
steel for coated sheet and hot rolled for coated sheet for both supply and demand 
functions were estimated and inserted into the model (the cross coefficients were 
included in the Ω and Η matrices, see MacAulay (2002)). The calculation of the 
coefficients for each region was as follows: 






































































where yi is demand for good i, αi is the intercept for demand i, and βij is the cross 
coefficient of demand for good i given the price of good j these coefficients are 
required for the spatial equilibrium model. It was assumed that the cross-price 
elasticity for good 1 given the price of good 2 was equal to the cross-price elasticity 
for good 2 given the price of good 1 (symmetry). The definition of the relationship 








































































The solution to equation (1), in terms of αi using equation (2) is: 
 














































































































The advantage of incorporating cross-price terms into the spatial model is that it will 
allow the three demand equations to act in a dependent way (as with supply). This 
modification to the model will mean the spatial model can be used to model any range 
of substitute and complementary goods by allowing price changes from a policy 
shock to be determined for the full range of goods, even if a certain policy issue only 
affects one of the goods examined.  
 
Tariffs are incorporated into the spatial equilibrium model through the arbitrage 
conditions (MacAulay 1992; Takayama and Judge 1971 and Koo and Larson 1985). 
The application of an ad valorem tariff is analogues to the incorporation of an 
exchange rate. Essentially, the ad valorem tariff increases the costs of transfer from 
one region to the other, and hence can be linked to the transportation cost (MacAulay 
1992, p. 305).  
 
When incorporated into the model, a converter matrix Rτ  can be  constructed to 
incorporate the tariffs (MacAulay 1992, p. 306). With different tariff rates for 
different trade flows, the arbitrage condition matrix (see MacAulay (2002) for a 
general formulation) becomes: 
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where Rτ is in a (n
2 x n
2) matrix. For example, if φij is 1/(1+τij) and the tariff rate τij is 
applied on the trade flow from region i to j then Rτ is a square n
2 x n
2 matrix for n 
regions and has φij terms on the main diagonal for those trade flows with tariffs (see 
MacAulay 1992) 
 
For use in the model, the ad valorem tariffs were applied to the steel demand price in 
the United States. With a tariff level equal to τ12 levied on the price of steel products 




12 1 12 1 t τρρ −− ≤  (6) 
 
Thus, a tariff of 30 percent would mean the value of (1-τ12), would be 0.7 in the 
arbitrage condition matrix. 
 
Australia successfully negotiated an exemption for 250 kilo-tonnes of hot rolled sheet 
imports. In order to incorporate this exemption into the model, an ‘within-quota’ tariff 
(the tariff applied to the first N units imported into a nation, where N is equal to the 
quota volume) of zero percent will be applied to the first 250 kilo-tonnes of hot rolled 
sheet exported to the United States, and an ‘above-quota’ tariff (the tariff applied to 
the importation of any units above the quota level N) of 30 percent will be applied to 
the remaining steel exports to the United States. The incorporation of a quota has been 
done by separating the trade flows into the United States into an within-quota trade 
flow with no tariff and a quota imposed, and an out-quota trade flow with the full 
tariff rate applied. Slab steel was subject to a global quota of 54 million tonnes which 
has been implemented in the model in a similar way to the Australian specific quota 
on hot rolled steel. 
 
Transfer costs for the model were estimated by using unit value differentials between 
regions. The differential chosen was calculated as the United States domestic price 
less the export unit value. The reason for this choice was due to the difficulties in 
obtaining transfer costs. Transfer costs were unavailable for the specific products 
examined with country specific prices also unavailable. Prices were available for the 
major countries or trading areas but not the smaller areas such as Australia. However, 
the price differences between export unit values and the United States domestic price 
did correspond with the trade flows, so that the net exporting regions — Australia and 
Japan — had lower export unit values than the United States domestic price. 
 
The difference in export unit values and the US domestic price includes the transfer 
costs from the exporting nation to the United States, but it may also include other 
factors. If exports are concentrated towards a higher or lower value sub-product, then 
the export unit value will be skewed towards the higher or lower price range. This 
may exaggerate or under estimate the transfer cost. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, 
as well as other factors influencing the US domestic price, the transfer costs obtained 
are the best available given the data set. 
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8. Results 
 
The results obtained from the spatial equilibrium model are presented in this section. 
The results are discussed in terms of changes in prices, quantities and economic 
surplus. In order to calculate the changes in producer and consumer surplus, a line 
integral was required. This was because the demand and supply equations were 
specified as a function of not only own price, but also of the price of the other goods 
in the model. In terms of the partial equilibrium, this relation to three variables means 
the demand and supply functions are a plane in a three dimensional space. The 
calculation used to determine the consumer and producer surplus for industry 1 is 
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where βji = cross-price coefficients of good j for price of good i; βii = Own price coefficient for good i; αi = demand intercept of 
good i; and  i P  = the equilibrium price of good i. 
 
This calculation is an adaptation of the calculation used in MacAulay (1976, p. 158) 
with the use of a line integral set out in Spiegel (1968, p. 121) and Stewart (1995, p. 
896). The problem with using line integrals to determine consumer and producer 
surplus is that they are path dependant (see MacAulay 1976, p. 158). However, for the 
purpose of this study, the change in consumer and producer surplus is relevant, and so 
the above formula was used for all calculations with the changes in surplus used to 




Using the model, the world price for the three steel products examined fell as a result 
of the safeguard measures. The price changes are shown in Table 2. The largest fall in 
price occurred for coated sheet steel, in which all countries with the exception of the 
United States experienced a fall of $US12.78. Despite the uniform drop in absolute 
price across nations other that the United States, the relative changes differed within 
nations. The relative differences in prices allowed producers in the model to substitute 
between different production activities, changing the direction and composition of 
exports. For the United States, the price levels for all products increased. The smallest 
increase was seen for slab steel as the barriers placed on this product were the least 
restrictive. 
 
The quota restriction gave rise to a quasi quota rent for both slab and hot rolled steel 
products. The quasi-quota rent estimated for Australian exports of slab and hot rolled 
steel was equal to $US18.88 and $US42.28 per tonne respectively. The global slab 
steel quota had an associated rent of $US18.88 per tonne. No nation continued to 




   18
Table 2: Changes in prices paid/received ($US/tonne) 
Country Product Pre Post Change Percentage Change
Australia Slab 209 207.53 -1.47 -0.701
United States 230 247.42 17.42 7.572
Japan 217 215.53 -1.47 -0.675
Rest of World
a 230 228.53 -1.47 -0.637
Rest of World
bc 228 226.53 -1.47 -0.643
Australia Hot rolled 290 286.20 -3.80 -1.310
United States 352 390.49 38.49 10.934
Japan 280 276.20 -3.80 -1.357
Rest of World
a 352 348.20 -3.80 -1.079
Rest of World
bc 306 302.20 -3.80 -1.241
Australia Coated sheet 653 640.11 -12.78 -1.957
United States 677 760.55 83.55 12.341
Japan 650 637.22 -12.78 -1.965
Rest of World
a 677 664.22 -12.78 -1.887
Rest of World
bc 675 662.22 -12.78 -1.893 
a. Rest of World importing nation, 
b. Rest of World exporting nation, 
c. supply price. 
 
8.2 Production 
Total trade in steel products fell from a pre safeguard level of 38.6 million tonnes of 
steel to a post level of 30.9 million tonnes. This represents a fall of close to 20 percent 
in world trade for the three products examined. The quota for slab steel was binding 
for both the Australian and global imports. Total exports to the United States, post 
safeguard actions, represented 5.75 million tonnes (the summed quota levels), a fall 
from 7.1 million tonnes. Changes in production and consumption are shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3: Production and consumption (million tonnes) 
Product Region Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
Slab 5874.67 5875.28 0.61 587.47 587.53 0.06
Hot rolled 3761.88 3761.03 -0.85 376.19 376.10 -0.09
Coated sheet 778.98 777.20 -1.79 77.90 77.72 -0.18
S l a b 8 . 0 5 48 . 0 70 . 0 1 6 . 5 16 . 5 10 . 0 0
Hot rolled 3.81 3.81 -0.01 3.29 3.30 0.01
Coated sheet 0.646 0.64 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00
Slab 93.425 93.29 -0.13 100.52 99.05 -1.47
Hot rolled 62.58 63.91 1.33 67.54 64.16 -3.38
Coated sheet 18.813 19.45 0.64 20.92 19.45 -1.47
Slab 91.547 91.81 0.27 89.29 89.23 -0.06
Hot rolled 51.31 51.20 -0.11 33.919 34.08 0.16
Coated sheet 11.298 11.21 -0.09 7.74 7.82 0.08
Slab 388.11 388.02 -0.09 391.15 392.73 1.58
Hot rolled 253.97 252.70 -1.27 271.44 274.56 3.12









Total production actually increased by just over 61 thousand tonnes as a result of the 
measures, an increase of 0.01 The reason for this change is linked to the trade 
diversion effects caused by the measures, for instance much of the slab steel originally 
exported to the United States was redirected to the Rest of World importing nation. 
Producers shifted production away from the hot rolled and coated sheet products and 
into slab steel production, as slab steel price was the least affected by the move (as it 
was subject to the least restrictive measures). As such, total production for hot rolled   19
and coated sheet products fell globally in response to the safeguard measures, with 
production of slab steel increasing. 
 
For the United States, the price of hot rolled and coated sheet products rose by a 
greater percent than seen for slab steel. This change in relative prices created a shift in 
production away from slabs as hot rolled and coated sheet products had a greater 
return. Interestingly, mini-mill producers who produce such products will benefit 
from this increase in price. The higher price received for the transformed products 
could create a situation where mini-mills increase their market share to the 
disadvantage of integrated producers. Thus response would undermine the purpose of 
the safeguard policy. 
 
Exports to the United States fell significantly in the three products examined as a 
result of the safeguard measures. Total imports fell by an average of 71 percent for all 
steel products examined in the study. This fall in imports should allow domestic 
producers in the United States the opportunity to restructure their industry without a 
fear of increases in foreign competition and loss of market share as a result. The 
reduction in imports equated to a fall in market share from 7.5 percent to 3.3 percent 
for the products examined. Changes in imports are presented in Table 4 
 
Table 4: Imports to the United States (million tonnes) 
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
Slab 0.44 0.35 -0.09 0.32 0.15 -0.17 6.33 5.25 -1.07
Hot rolled 0.24 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.21 4.51 0.00 -4.51




a Rest of World importing nation 
 
8.3 Economic surplus 
 
The effects of the safeguard measures on consumer and producer surplus are shown in 
Table 5. For all nations except the United States, producer surplus fell and consumer 
surplus increased. The net effect in the Rest of World region was the smallest, as it 
had the largest change in exports and imports. Consumers benefited from the 
redirected cheaper imports, whilst producers lost export markets and local sales.  
 
The results for Australia and Japan are similar and show that total surplus actually 
increased. The cause of this increase in total surplus was due to the redirection of 
exports away from the United States to the Rest of World importing nation and a shift 
in the composition of production away from highly protected products. An 
assumption of the spatial equilibrium model is that producers can costless (ignoring 
the differences in relative transfer costs), shift exports from one region to the other, as 
such the most viable option from producers in Australia and Japan was to seek 
alternate markets. Further, as the elasticity of demand in the Rest of World importing 
nation was relatively more elastic, the lower price led to greater demand, meaning this 
nation was able to absorb the shift in exports. 
 
For the United States, the implementation of the safeguard measures led to a net loss 
in surplus. The measures did increase domestic production, and as such, increased   20
producer surplus. Despite this, the impact on US consumers was great, meaning that 
the surplus gained for producers was outweighed by the lost incurred by consumers. 
 
Table 5: Changes in economic surplus ($US millions) 
Industry Region Change in Producer Surplus Change in Consumer Surplus
Slab Total 15.17 -34.74
Hot rolled 15.18 -22.61
Coated sheet 15.30 -21.23
Totals 45.65 -78.58
Total Change in surplus -32.92
Slab Australia -1.24 3.72
Hot rolled -1.97 2.72
Coated sheet -1.49 2.13
Totals -4.70 8.57
Total Change in surplus 3.87
Slab United States 20.64 -45.85
Hot rolled 21.87 -31.28
Coated sheet 20.26 -26.96
Totals 62.78 -104.08
Total Change in surplus -41.31
Slab Japan -1.74 4.39
Hot rolled -1.95 2.71
Coated sheet -1.50 2.02
Totals -5.20 9.12
Total Change in surplus 3.92
Slab Rest of World -2.49 3.01
Hot rolled -2.77 3.24
Coated sheet -1.97 1.57
Totals -7.23 7.82
Total Change in surplus 0.59 
 
9. Policy responses 
 
Policy response surfaces were formulated in order to examine alternative responses of 
Australian steel producers. In order to map the policy response surfaces, a set of 
varying tariff levels were used. Because there were three products examined, three 
different policy response surfaces were estimated, namely, slab-hot rolled, slab-coated 
sheet and hot rolled-coated sheet. The policy response surfaces map differing levels of 
producer revenue collected by Australian producers for a range of tariff levels 
between zero and 30 percent. The tariffs that will be used to map changes in producer 
revenue will be all combinations of 30, 10, 5, 3 and 0 percent for each product (with 
no concessions). 
 
The returns to producers varied with differing levels of slab and hot rolled tariff 
combinations. The producer revenue surface is shown on Figure 6(a) where producer 
revenue is graphed as change in revenue from the no tariff situation. From Figure 
6(a), it can be seen that any relaxation in the slab tariff level (T1) would yield the 
greatest benefit for Australian producers. Even with a zero tariff level on hot rolled 
steel the gain to Australian producers is marginal (given a 30 percent tariff on slab 
steel). The reason for this is that slab steel is Australia’s most competitive steel 
product, and hence the greatest benefits would occur if Australian producers were 
allowed to further specialise in the production of this product. Australian producers   21
would capture any extra returns from an increase in the price of slab steel that occurs 
with the increase in the price of the other two products (prices of substitute goods tend 
to move in the same direction).  
 
Figure 6: Policy response surfaces 
 
  (a) Slab hot rolled  (b) Slab coated sheet  (c) Hot rolled coated sheet 
 
Where PR = producer revenue change in $US100,000, T1 = slab tariff level, and T2 = hot rolled tariff level. 
 
With tariff free imports of slab or hot rolled steel into the United States, Australian 
producers would benefit through the ability to take advantage of the higher domestic 
price. Although, tariff free access (for Australia) would increase Australian 
production and exports significantly, the extra quantities would not place enough 
pressure on US prices to force them down to pre safeguard levels. Combinations of 
tariffs for slab steel 10 percent and above yielded a negative result for Australian 
producers independent of the hot rolled steel tariff. 
 
The policy surface estimated for slab-coated sheet products in terms of producer 
revenue is shown in Figure 6(b). The results are similar to those seen for the slab-hot 
rolled policy response functions as tariff free access for slab steel yields the greatest 
benefits for producers. In the case of hot rolled-coated sheet tariff free access for 
either coated sheet or hot rolled steel would still mean that the Australian steel 
industry would be worse off than with the zero tariff position. With zero tariff access 
for hot rolled steel and full tariff rate on coated sheet, Australian producers are only 
marginally better off (Figure 6(c)). This indicates that if no slab steel concession was 
given, Australian steel producers should lobby for a total reduction instead of any 
concession on hot rolled or slab steel products. 
 
An implication from the above analysis is that the best outcome for Australian 
producers is to have some form of preferential access to the US market (assuming the 
concession was given on slab steel). This policy only arises from the producer point 
of view, and if consumer surplus (or as a proxy consumer expenditure change) were 
modelled, the best position for Australia would be at the lowest points on Figures 
6(a), (b) and (c). These points would show points of lowest cost to Australian 
consumers. 
 
This conclusion appears obvious, but the implications of the cross elasticities 
signalling that the products were in some way substitutes for the purpose of the study, 
mean that only one product would need to have tariff free access into the US market 
for benefits to flow from the other products in the study. The increase in price that   22
would be created through tariff free access into a protected market would not only 
increase the price of that good, but place upward pressure on the prices of the other 
goods. The concept of total elasticity is a useful way to envisage the overall effect 
(Tomek and Robinson 1990). The increased price, for slab steel, would lead to 
decreased domestic demand for that good, but increased demand for both hot rolled 
and coated sheet products. This increase in demand reduces the downward pressure 
that is placed on prices as a result of the tariffs placed on the importation of those 
products into the United States.  
 
10. Concluding comments 
 
The impacts of the safeguard measures on the world steel industry can be viewed 
through examining changes in producer and consumer surplus. It was seen from the 
results, that the initial position was more efficient for the global steel market because 
of the negative change in total surplus that has occurred with the safeguard tariffs. It 
can be said, that free trade provides greater overall benefits, whilst trade protection 
leads to short term benefits for protected steel producers.  
 
Total surplus for the global steel market is seen to fall by $US32.92 million due to the 
imposition of the safeguard actions. Benefits for steel producers in the United States 
(measured in the form of producer surplus) increased by $US62.78 million, with 
losses in consumer surplus equal to $US104.08 million. Due to this overall loss, a 
more efficient policy to enable the US steel industry to restructure would be one 
aimed at market reforms, and not trade protection.  
 
A figure excluded from the change in producer and consumer surplus is the transfer 
that occurs with the impositions of tariffs and quotas. The United States government 
may receive an income stream from these protection measures depending on the 
structure of the quota. Governments traditionally face a lower treasury cost — with 
the economy facing efficiency costs due to trade protection than under 
microeconomic polices which involve budget outlays. The United States is a large 
importer, and as such, can benefit from the imposition of trade barriers. The effect of 
the trade distorting measures used — tariffs and quotas — led to a fall in world price. 
This fall allows for the US government to capture some surplus from the world steel 
market. With the inclusion of the surplus from quota revenue, the US economy would 
actually gain (quasi-quota rent can be viewed as a surplus transfer) equal to $US77.69 
million. 
 
Due to the size of the US economy, the imposition of the safeguard trade barriers has 
the possibility of benefiting its economy. However, the benefits to the steel market 
would only increase if the quota revenue were transferred to this market (which may 
be the case). As this quasi-rent may be placed into treasury depending on the structure 
of the quota, the revenue collected may go to other causes, leading to a net loss in the 
market. This rent also ignores administration costs, which are usually high with 
quotas if the revenue is to be collect by governments due to difficulties in collection. 
With appropriate permit controls, it is possible that the quota rent may not be 
collected by the United States, and in fact be collected by world exporters, or 
importing firms depending on degrees of market power or levels of regulation. 
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The trade protection measures used by the United States were supposed to provide an 
environment in which domestic steel producers can expand output, increase revenues 
and hence provide the means to allow for structural reform. The higher price levels 
encourage increases in production. This increase in production requires a shift in 
resources away from other sectors of the US economy, in which these resources 
would have been better used given world prices. However, it has been shown that 
trade protection by a large nation has several external and internal effects. If it was 
viewed by the US government that this policy was best — either the costs to the 
market are worth paying, or that government revenue is favoured over outlays — the 
response by the steel industry may not be what the government is after. It has been 
seen throughout history that the US government has intervened in the steel market 
whenever steel producers were adversely affected by imports. This continual 
intervention has meant that steel producers have relied on the government if the 
economic situation turned against them. This policy has caused unproductive 
practices and large excess capacity to remain in the industry. The question becomes, 
would this be any different this time? 
 
The results obtained from the analysis of the safeguard actions show an increase in the 
price of all steel products within the United States. These price movements, however, 
were not uniform and were skewed towards the higher valued products such as coated 
sheet and hot rolled steel. Both integrated steel producers and mini-mills produce 
these two products. The safeguard policy was primarily aimed at the larger integrated 
producers due to their political significance and the fact that it was these producers 
that were most under threat from the surge in imports. With the higher prices 
favouring the products that mini-mills produce, the safeguard barriers may not help 
the integrated producers, but allow mini-mills to capture more of the US market at the 
expense of the integrated producers. 
 
Finally, some avenues for further work could be suggested here. The model chosen to 
was a spatial equilibrium model. As with any model, the accuracy of the results 
obtained depends largely on the quality of the data used. As such, a study conducted 
on supply and demand elasticities would have complemented the analysis. 
 
Data on supply, exports, imports and consumption for the products studied were 
particularly difficult to obtain. This difficulty meant that some of the categories 
originally chosen had to be aggregated in order to obtain the necessary data points. 
With aggregation of products, the problem of non-homogeneity arises. It was 
necessary for the spatial equilibrium model to assume homogeneity between products 
produced by different nations. This assumption may hold (or may not, see Armington 
(1979)), but with a higher level of aggregation, representative prices become difficult 
to obtain — particularly if export unit values are used (export unit values represent the 
value of exports, and hence if these exports are oriented toward a higher value sub-
product, export unit values will be higher without necessarily representing a higher 
cost production process). Non-homogeneity may appear in the form of two-way trade 
flows in the same product in the observed data. 
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